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BANKRUPTCY - SUFFERANCE OF TURNOVER ORDER AS AN ACT OF
BANKRUPTCY - A parent corporation formed a subsidiary corporation in
1932, and transferred to the subsidiary certain of its assets. In 1938 the parent
filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy and was adjudicated a bankrupt. Over
a year later the referee entered a turnover order requiring the subsidiary to
transfer to the parent's trustee all of its assets on the ground that the original
transfer was void as being in fraud of creditors, and on the further ground that
the subsidiary was in fact the "alter ego" of the parent corporation. Three days
after this order was issued, creditors of the subsidiary filed a petition in involuntary bankruptcy against it, alleging that the issuance of the turnover order
amounted to an act of bankruptcy. Held, that the subsidiary corporation committed the fifth act of bankruptcy by having, while insolvent, suffered the appointment of a receiver or trustee to take charge of its property.1 Fish v. East,
(C. C. A. 10th, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 177.

1 "Acts of bankruptcy by a person shall consist of his having •.• (5) while
insolvent or unable to pay his debts as they mature, procured, permitted, or suffered
voluntarily or involuntarily the appointment of a receiver or trustee to take charge of
his property.•••" 52 Stat. L. 844-845, § 3a (1938), II U.S. C. (Supp. 1939), §
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The reason for making_ the appointment of a receiver during insolvency
an act of bankruptcy is that the receivership substantially abridges the rights of
the creditors to elect a trustee of their own choosing, or that it deprives them
of the right to share proratably with all other creditors of the same class. 2 The
courts have indicated that three elements must be present to constitute a receivership within section 3a(5): (1) some person must be placed in charge of the
property,8 (2) the property must be that of the debtor,4 and (3) the receivership
must be general as to all that property, and not merely for the enforcement of
a specific lien. 5 The existence of a fourth element might be concluded from the
fact that in all the formerly cited cases the receivership was for the benefit
of the creditors of the particular debtor. But in the present case the turnover
order directs that the assets be given to the trustee of the parent, who represents
a class of creditors technically not the creditors of the subsidiary; and even
though the court is willing to look through the corporate entities and view the
subsidiary as the mere "alter ego" of the parent, it is possible that the creditors
of the parent would not be allowed to seek satisfaction for their debts from the
assets of the subsidiary without first allowing the creditors of the subsidiary
full satisfaction of their own claims from those assets.6 In the second place it is
arguable that the assets directed to be delivered to the trustee of the parent are
not the property of the subsidiary within the second principle above stated, in
so far as the basis of the turnover order is that the original conveyance to the
subsidiary was fraudulent and conferred no rights upon the subsidiary as between it and the creditors of the parent. The present case, then, seemingly lacks
two of the factors normally present in the fifth act of bankruptcy. However,
there is a possible justification for the decision of this case. It is not inconceivable that even though the conveyance as between the parent's creditors and
the - subsidiary corporation was void, the subsidiary's creditors might have
acquired some claims of their own as to those assets, or through special powers
given to the trustee under the Bankruptcy Act they might be able to establish
I CoLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed., § 3.503 (1940).
In re Electric Supply Co., (D. C. Ga. 1909) 175 F. 612; In re C. H. Bennett
Shoe Co., (D. C. Conn. 1905) 140 F. 687; In re International Coal Mining Co.,
(D. C. Pa. 1906) 143 F. 665.
4
In re Yegen, (C. C. A. 9th, 1924) I F. (2d) 841; In re Luxor Cab Mfg.
Corp. of America, (C. C. A. 2d, 1928) 25 F. (2d) 646.
5
Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. E.T. Sheftall & Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1931) 53
F. (2d) 40; Elfast v. Lamb, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) III F. (2d) 434; Tuttle v.
Harris, 297 U.S. 225, 56 S. Ct. 416 (1936); Duparquet Huot & Moneuse v. Evans,
297 U. S. 216, 56 S. Ct. 412 (1936). Contra: see In re 2II East Delaware Place
Bldg. Corp., (D. C. Ill. 1936) 14 F. Supp. 96.
6
Carroll v. Stern, (C. C. A. 6th, 1915) 223 F. 723. That the preference of the
creditors of the subsidiary corporation might be allowed if the claim of the creditors
of the parent against the assets of the subsidiary is only as creditors of an "alter
ego" corporation, see Imperial Paper & Color Corp. v. Sampsell, (C. C. A. 9th,
1940) II4 F. (2d) 49. Cf. Gay v. Hudson River Electric Power Co., (C. C. A.
2d, 19u) 187 F. 12, in which the preference was allowed in the nature of set-off,
although the court expressly limited this case to its facts.
2
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their own prior rights. 7 If they should be allowed to perfect those claims in their
own trustee, their rights, which would otherwise have to be asserted in individual reclamation proceedings, could be asserted in a single action against the
turnover order. In seeking this priority, the creditors of the subsidiary could claim
that their demand for a separate administration in bankruptcy comes within
the purpose of the fifth act inasmuch as they are trying to secure to themselves,
as a class, rights superior to those of creditors of the parent. Their alternative
would be to allow the assets of the subsidiary to pass into the hands of the trustee
of the parent and then place their claims with that trustee so as to share in one
bankruptcy proceeding. 8 By coming into the parent's bankruptcy proceeding they
might have a right to a trustee of their own choosing,° even though it is doubtful whether they could assert a right to prior satisfaction from the assets of the
subsidiary in view of the fact that all of its assets came by a void conveyance.10

John C. Johnston
7 Under 52 Stat. L. 881, § 70c, (1938), 11 U. S. C. (Supp. 1939), § 110 c,
the trustee, as to all property in the possession or under the control of the bankrupt
at the date of bankruptcy or otherwise coming into the possession of the bankruptcy
court, is deemed vested as of the date of bankruptcy with all the rights, remedies, and
powers of a creditor then holding a lien thereon by legal or equitable proceedings,
whether or not such a creditor actually exists. By application of this section, it could
be claimed that the trustee of the subsidiary established a lien on the property of the
subsidiary as of the date of its bankruptcy, and under that line of cases represented by
In re Mullen, (D. C. Mass. 1900) IOI F. 413, this lien should then operate to defeat
the right of the trustee in bankruptcy of the parent even as to a fraudulent conveyance.
However, the trustee of the parent could avail himself of the same provision, if he
could in any way establish that his possession of the property precluded the application
of § 70c for the benefit of the subsidiary's trustee. Thus it would seem that this
question would tum on whether or not the subsidiary's trustee had actual possession of
those assets, or whether the turnover order would have operated to give a constructive
possession to the trustee of the parent.
8
ln re Rieger, Kapner & Altmark, (D. C. Ohio, 1907) 157 F. 609; In re Berkowitz, (D. C. N. J. 1908) 173 F. 1013; In re Eilers Music House, (C. C. A. 9th,
1921) 270 F. 915; Salt Lake Valley Canning Co. v. Collins, (C. C. A. 9th, 1910) 176
F. 91; In re Southwestern Bridge & Iron Co., (D. C. Kan. 1904) 133 F. 568; Central Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Caldwell, (C. C. A. 8th, 1932) 58 F. (2d) 721;
Rennells v. Potter, 198 Mich. 49, 164 N. W. 475 (1917).
9
In re Foley, (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) 4 F. (2d) 154; Salt Lake Valley Canning Co.
v. Collins, (C. C. A. 9th, 1910) 176 F. 91.
10
In both Carroll v. Stem, (C. C. A. 6th, 1915) 223 F. 723, and Imperial Paper
& Color Corp. v. Sampsell, (C. C. A. 9th, 1940) 114 F. (2d) 49, the courts indicate their willingness to give priority to the creditors of the subsidiary from the assets
of the subsidiary even though in the bankruptcy proceedings of the parent, but in
neither of these cases was the claim of the parent's creditors based on the theory that
the conveyance of assets to the subsidiary was void. In both the assets were recognized
as being those of the subsidiary and the creditors of the parent could claim in that
capacity alone. In In re International Coal Mining Co., (D. C. Pa. 1906) 143 F. 665,
the creditor of the bankrupt subsidiary was allowed to recover in full from the solvent
parent, but this recovery was based on a bond given by the parent in consideration
for a transfer of assets from the subsidiary to the parent after the receivership.

